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Abstract
Do landlocked countries face special economic development problems? Whereas traditional
neoclassical theory is ambiguous, more recent directions in trade theory and the theory of
economic growth suggest reasons why landlocked countries might be at a disadvantage. Our
empirical evidence confirms the hypothesis that landlocked countries experience slower
economic growth.
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Introduction
Thirty years ago, blaming problems of economic underdevelopment on geography (or climate)
would likely have led to accusations of "environmental determinism." However, as economic
divergence between rich and poor countries, as well as between middle-income and low-
income developing countries, has persisted (Pritchett 1997), it has again become acceptable
to seek the causes of poor economic performance in "natural" factors. Gallup et al. (1998)
suggest that location and climate, through their impacts on transportation costs, the burden of
disease and agricultural productivity, have significant effects on development. In this paper, we
focus on one of the main geographical disadvantages that a country can face, being
landlocked.
A comprehensive bibliography (Glassner 1992) on the subject of the economic development
problems of landlocked countries (LLCs) lists many hundreds of entries. A good number of
these treat legal problems having to do with rights of passage over the territory of coastal
transit states (TSs) and the access of LLCs to marine resources under the International Law of
the Sea. Even excluding such legal and administrative studies, however, the list of economic
planning documents, transport feasibility studies, etc. runs into hundreds of entries. All the
major international organizations are represented.
It is striking is that this literature takes it virtually for granted that LLCs really do face special
economic development problems. However, the case against landlockedness is ambiguous.1
After all, the only thing that sets a LLC apart from the hinterland regions of the coastal TS is
the presence of an international border which goods must cross. In this article, we present a
review of how landlocked status might interfere with development. It is hard to make a strong
case against landlockedness on the basis of the traditional neoclassical theories of growth and
trade; on the other hand, the more recent directions in trade theory and the theory of economic
growth more generally allow for a stronger case. In fact, any model of development which
stresses outward looking orientation or the productivity-enhancing effects of exports for
production would identify being landlocked as an impediment to growth. We then present some
empirical evidence that LLCs may experience lower per capita economic growth on account of
geographic disadvantage. The evidence is significant: Landlockedness reduces average growth
by about 1.5 percentage points per year.
                                                                                                                                                                                       
1
 A closely related question is the impact on economic development of being small and remote. Srinivasen (1986)
found no reason in theory to believe that such countries experience slower economic development and his
skepticism was empirically confirmed by Milner and Westaway (1993).
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Why might being landlocked matter? Theory
One of the few robust findings in the international cross-sectional analysis of economic growth
rates is that the share of trade in GDP, mediated through its impact on the investment share, is
positively associated with the rate of economic growth. This suggests that, whatever causal
mechanisms are at work, the effects of geographical disadvantage are most likely to work
through reductions in the volume of trade.
Neoclassical theory. When goods cross a border, there will be transaction costs having to do
with customs and handling. If there is a switch in transport modes, there will be offloading and
onloading costs, and perhaps storage costs as well. Therefore, landlockedness can be thought
of as raising the price of imports, and reducing the price of exports net of transport costs
(which must be absorbed by a price-taking seller in order to compete internationally). Thus,
LLCs suffer deterioration in their terms of trade and a resulting reduction in real income. The
greater the share of primary commodities in the export basket, and of finished goods in the
import basket, the greater the terms-of-trade loss, because transport costs are typically low
per unit of value for primary goods and high per unit of value for manufactures. The income
effect of the terms-of-trade loss is to reduce the volume of imports. The substitution effect is to
cause consumers to switch from imports to domestic goods, reducing the exportable surplus
as the opportunity cost of consuming at home instead of exporting falls. Both the import and
substitution effects reduce the share of total trade (imports plus exports) in GDP. LLCs may
import less (i.e., engage in inefficient import substitution) and export less (i.e., fail to exploit
otherwise attractive export opportunities) than would be warranted by comparative advantage
exclusive of transport costs. Note, however, that in many cases the costs arising from
landlockedness will be less (in extreme instances, an order of magnitude less) than import
tariffs and export taxes already in place.
An alternative interpretation is that LLCs pay to the TS a tariff on incoming goods and tax on
outbound goods. As a transport monopolist, the TS has no wish to kill the goose which lays
the golden eggs; rather, it will charge transport rates which reflect the price elasticity of
demand and supply in the LLC.
2
 A third interpretation is that, when a TS rations the supply of
transport to an LLC, the quotas thus created give rise to rents in the form of price gauging and,
                                                                                                                                                                                       
2 Take the case of incoming goods M and consider the situation in which the TS is considering levying a tax t. Tax
revenue T will be the tax rate times the new volume of imports, taken as the excess of demand D over domestic
supply S:
T= t [(D + dD/dP t) - (S + dS/dP t)]
and dP = t. Assume that, in the short run, dS/dP = 0, in which case the revenue-maximizing tax rate is
t = - (M/D) (1/2åD)
where M/D is the share of imports in demand and åD is the price elasticity of demand. The greater the import
share and the more price-inelastic import demand, the higher the tax. Extension to take into account the price
elasticity of supply is straightforward.
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perhaps, corruption.3 Finally, vulnerability of the LLC to strategic disruption is a factor often
cited by authors. However, arguing by analogy from empirical evidence regarding the effect of
punitive trade sanctions, the economic impact of trade disruption may be modest (van Bergeijk
1995). The uncertainty factor, exacerbated by the often strained political relations between
LLCs and TSs, may be more important than actual costs: indeed, a World Bank study
identified reliability of transit, not cost, as the main criterion for project design and appraisal
(World Bank Operations Evaluation Division 1994). LLCs' access to ports is governed mostly
by bilateral treaties with TSs, most of these are fixed term, many are ad hoc and some
comprise only a small part of larger treaties. Uncertainty over deliveries may make potential
customers wary of signing long-term export contracts and discourage foreign firms from
locating plants in LLCs. However, rather few LLCs are completely dependent on one TS, and
what dependency relationships do exist can be ameliorated over time by negotiating alternative
routes and undertaking integrated regional investment programs.
Endogenous growth theory and "new trade theory." In neoclassical theory, based on perfect
competition and constant returns to scale, the gains to trade are static. While neoclassical
theory offers an explanation why LLCs might be at a disadvantage in the near term, it offers
little explanation why this disadvantage might be insurmountable in the longer term. For
example, consider Switzerland, which has developed economic sectors which perform well
despite landlockedness. Put differently, alleviating the problems associated with landlocked-
ness might lead to a one-off improvement in a LLC's welfare level, but it would not shift the LLC
to a more rapid growth path.
But many argue that neoclassical theory greatly understates the importance of trade in a
dynamic context. If so, the reductions in trade suffered by LLCs might act as a serious drag on
economic growth. In "endogenous growth" models there are either increasing returns to scale
in certain sectors or externalities to output in those sectors. Learning-by-doing (cumulative
increasing returns to scale) and externalities to research and development are major themes in
this literature. The sources of growth (investment, human capital accumulation, technological
innovation, and provision of infrastructure and public goods) differ from model to model, as does
the underlying competitive mechanism (perfect competition or oligopoly). A common
conclusion is, however, that poor initial conditions can ensnare countries in a low-level trap by
limiting opportunities for economic growth. The door is opened to a range of "big push" public
policy measures, including industrial policy, regional policy, trade policy, and provision of
infrastructure and public support for human capital formation, research and development, etc.
The important role of increasing returns to scale provides a natural link between "endogenous
growth" theory and "new trade theory" (Krugman 1987), the gist of which is that government
should play an active role in trade.
                                                                                                                                                                                       
3
  The rationing of transport supply to the LLC will be exacerbated in the many cases where transport
infrastructure in the TS itself is inadequate.
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Trade can shift rates of growth by changing the composition of output (e.g., Grossman and
Helpman 1991, Dosi et al. 1990). Since the changing composition of output affects relative
prices, comparative advantage is in effect endogenized. This effect is accentuated if there are
learning-by-doing externalities at the sectoral level, i.e., if one sector learns from another. Being
landlocked, by reducing the volume of trade, might prevent comparative advantage from evolving
and thus ensnare LLCs in a low-level equilibrium trap. Alternatively, by reducing exposure to
foreign competition, being landlocked might stifle the growth of entrepreneurial talent.
4
Not only trade flows, but the location decisions of firms (which eventually determine trade
flows) are crucial in a dynamic increasing-returns-to-scale environment (Krugman 1991).
Agglomeration economies are external economies which are reaped either when a large
number of firms in the same industry locate in close proximity to each other or when a large
number of firms from different industries locate in the same region or city. In the latter case, the
economies are referred to as urbanization economies. Innovation-driven high-tech industries,
which depend on a fluid market for highly specialized workers, information, and access to a
reliable, speedy and sophisticated services sector, are highly dependent on agglomeration
economies - witness the growth of Silicon Valley in California. As a result of their geographical
isolation, especially their lack of a port city, LLCs may find it difficult to attract firms in rapidly
evolving, high-growth industries. Once again, "big push" policy interventions might be warranted
in LLCs.
5
Finally, provision of infrastructure itself has strong positive external economies (World Bank,
1994). Availability of good transport infrastructure enhances the productivity of all other inputs
(Vickerman 1996) and enhances the rate of return to formation of both physical and human
capital. On the other hand, the productivity-enhancing impact of transport investment is to
some degree offset when firms substitute away from traditional inputs in favor of cheaper
transport.
Other aspects. Other factors, difficult to quantify or even describe with precision, are bound to
influence the development path of LLCs.  LLCs are twice vulnerable to disruption in the form of
natural disasters, political unrest and violent international conflict: once on their own account
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 While there is little understanding of the underlying causal link (which must work through the entry and exit of
firms) there at least appears to be a statistical association between exposure to foreign trade and technical
efficiency of plants (Tybout 1992).
 5
 There may, however, be a more complicated dynamic to industrial location decisions. A dynamic model from
regional economics (Barry 1996) illustrates how, as transport costs decline, industries (especially in increasing-
return industries) first migrate from the periphery to the core in order to reap agglomeration economies. While the
availability of cheaper goods benefits consumers in both core and periphery, shifting industrial location leads to
divergence in real wages; eventually the wage differential is more important than agglomeration economies and
firms begin to move back to the periphery. This model suggests that, as transport impediments were removed, an
LLC might lose increasing-returns industries to the TS; as these industries left, the returns to human capital
accumulation and R&D would decline, with important external effects. This phenomenon is, of course, dynamic, it
would be fully consistent with one-off gains to trade which would result from reducing transport costs.
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and once on account of the TS. In a sense, LLCs may be doubly marginalized, once on
account of their landlockedness, and again because the TS on which they depend is itself
underdeveloped (Reitsma 1980). Regarding the problem of violent conflict, LLCs practically by
definition have many borders, and one of the few robust stylized facts from quantitative
international relations is that the incidence of violent international conflict is positively corre-
lated with number of international boundaries. Similarly, one of the strongest conclusions from
the economic development record is that peace is a prerequisite for economic development.
Many borders, as well as the dependency relationship existing between the TS and LLC, may
exacerbate brain drain and the siphoning off of skilled labor. Or, productivity gains arising when
labor is transferred from low-productivity to higher-productivity sectors will be foregone if low-
productivity labor simply migrates to the TS instead.
LLCs have no access to some economic opportunities, such as coastal fishing and tourism
development, which are available only to countries possessing a coast. On the other hand,
fishing is usually a minor sector except on the sub-national regional scale, and many countries
with virtually no tourism sector whatsoever have nonetheless experienced rapid economic
development.
Policy response. Assume that landlockedness really does pose a problem for economic
development. What should be the policy response? In neoclassical theory, the main rationale
for government intervention is the presence of distortions, of which the negative externality to
transit through a monopolistic TS is a straightforward example. The advice to policy makers
would be to impose a Pigovian tax on traded goods and dedicate the proceeds to developing
alternative transportation routes.
6
 While the cost of developing alternative transport routes
would represent a considerable initial deadweight cost, there is no reason in neoclassical
theory why it would impede development in the long run.
7
Endogenous growth theory and the new trade theory would justify stronger interventions.
However, as applied to developing countries in general, and LLCs in particular, arguments
derived from endogenous growth theory and the new trade theory must be qualified (Alam
1995). First, very few LLCs have any competitive advantage in the sorts of high-tech industries
for which dynamic increasing returns to scale appear likely. With the exception of a few
                                                                                                                                                                                       
 6
 The case is analogous to that of the so-called national security premium which should be imposed when a
country is dependent for a strategic input on a single supplier. By reducing demand, the tariff acts to capture
some of the monopoly profits which would have otherwise been earned by the TS. The crucial assumption is, of
course, that the revenues generated are not simply captured by government, in which case the consumer would
have ended up merely paying twice the penalty for being landlocked. We also assume no response on the part of
the TS.
 7
 Existing transport routes may well reflect comparative topographical advantage and almost certainly do
represent comparative advantage in the provision and operation of transport infrastructure. Thus, in southern
Africa, attempts to develop alternative transport routes through Tanzania (the Tanzam rail route) and the upgrade
the Beira corridor through Mozambique proved to be costly fiascos.
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European examples like Hungary, the possibility even of developing comparative advantage in
such sectors appears remote. Second, the dynamic increasing returns argument assumes that
the domestic market is large enough that infant industries, if protected, can produce enough to
start realizing economies of scale. Most LLCs, however, are small. While industrial structure is
highly concentrated in most developing countries, it is market imperfections such as collusion
and barriers to entry which are responsible, not increasing returns to scale.
It seems sensible that if the problems of landlockedness arise from transport, policy makers
use transport policy to address them. Transport infrastructure within LLCs is usually of
relatively poor quality, so domestic transport investment may, so to speak, get consumers
back to where they were without the problem of being landlocked. This is a second-best out-
come, but represents progress nonetheless while avoiding the dangers implicit in using
industrial and trade policy to address what is fundamentally a transport problem. Finally, the
regional dimension is crucial: improvements in transit benefit both LLCs and TSs, and the
natural units for transport policy intervention are not the nation, but the region and the transport
corridor.
Empirical evidence
Statistical overview. The concentration of LLCs among the least well-off nations of the world is
impressive. 63 out of 158 low- and middle-income countries (as defined by the World Bank) are
classified as low income (40.0 percent), but 20 out of 30 low- and middle-income LLCs (66.6
percent) are classified as low-income.
8
 If the fifteen Newly Independent States (the Baltic
countries plus former republics of the Soviet Union) are excluded, then the situation is starker:
58 out of 143 (40.6 percent) low- and middle-income countries are low-income, but 16 out of 22
low- and middle-income LLCs (72.7 percent) are low-income. Finally, and most impressive of
all, 9 of the 20 poorest countries in the world are landlocked. In part, this is because many
LLCs are African, but even in this region, LLCs account for a disproportionate number of the
poorest countries on this poorest continent.
We have suggested above that most of the problems faced by LLCs can be related to higher
transport costs. Transport costs depend, however, on remoteness as well as landlocked
status, so rather than present data at the global scale, Table 1 presents summary measures
for LLCs and TSs in six geographic clusters. One such measure is the "CIF-FOB ratio", that is,
                                                                                                                                                                                       
8
 In increasing order of per capita income (according to the 1998 World Development Indicators), the LLCs are:
Burundi, Chad, Malawi, Zambia, Rwanda, Mongolia, Nepal, Bhutan, Mali, Burkina Faso, Lao PDR, Niger, Central
African Republic, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Bolivia, Paraguay, Botswana, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic,
and Hungary. Among the former Soviet Republics, again in increasing order of per capita income (estimates of
which are sketchy), the LLCs are Tajikstan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Moldova,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus.
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the value of imported merchandise measured on a cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) basis in
percentage of the value of the same goods measured on a free on board (FOB) basis. The CIF-
FOB ratio can be found in the International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics
series. Another measure is the ratio of freight charges to imports of merchandise FOB,
available from the IMF's Balance of Payments Yearbook . While not exactly the same, the two
measures should be very closely related.
Looking at averages for the period 1980-95, in West Africa, freight charges averaged 26.0
percent of the value of merchandise imports FOB in five LLCs (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger,
Central African Republic and Chad) as opposed to 12.4 percent in five regional TSs (Guinea,
Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Nigeria). CIF-FOB factors were 1.264 and 1.139, respectively. In
five Southern African LLCs (Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), freight
charges averaged over the period 1980-95 represented 19.1 percent of imports FOB, as
opposed to an average of 10.0 percent in the four regional TSs (Mozambique, Namibia, South
Africa and Tanzania).
9
 CIF-FOB ratios were 1.193 and 1.106. If the enclave state of Lesotho
(whose imports come almost exclusively from South Africa) is excluded, freight charges
represented 22.9 percent of the value of imports in LLCs.
10
 A similar situation prevails in
Central Africa and also in Latin America. However, there are only two LLCs in Latin America
making comprehensive statements rather difficult
Other regions, however, are ambiguous. In Asia, the few LLCs in the region are heavily
dependent on immediate neighbors for imports (Nepal on India, the Lao PDR on Vietnam and
China, Mongolia on China). In Europe, all three LLCs have access to the sea through the
Danube.
Regression analysis
The overrepresentation of LLCs among the world's poorest countries makes it clear without any
formal test that landlocked status is statistically correlated with level of per capita income,
although no causal association can be inferred. A more important question is whether
landlocked status is associated with differences in economic growth rates, i.e., whether LLCs
                                                                                                                                                                                       
9
 This is simply the unweighted arithmetic average across countries.
10
 The case of Lesotho, which is an extreme example of landockedness on account of being an enclave of the
TS (South Africa), illustrates one of the pitfalls of interpreting trade and transport data for LLCs. One rational
response to the high transport costs associated with landlockedness is to buy goods manufactured in the TS --
freight costs are low in Lesotho because an elevated share of imports is South African in origin. A less
spectacular case is that of Nepal, which despite expressing persistent concern related to its transport
dependence on India, actually enjoys lower freight costs than India: most Nepali imports are Indian goods; most
Indian imports are interscontinental. Differences in the nature of goods imported may also, in some cases, be a
significant factor.
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are caught in a low-income trap. The current economic growth literature focuses on functions of
the general form
d ln(Y/POP) = ß0 + ß1 ln (Y/POP)0 + ß2 X
where Y/POP is per capita income, (Y/POP)0 is initial year income and X is a vector of relevant
conditioning variables (Amable 1994). The rate of growth of an economy is thus a function of its
initial-year level of development and a range of other variables. If ß1 < 0, there is convergence
(so-called b-convergence): the poorer a country is in the initial time period, the faster it grows.
The current sense of the literature is that there is "conditional convergence," meaning that
convergence occurs conditional on the rate of accumulation of factors.
11
 Results are, however,
sensitive to the choice of the vector X of conditioning variables (Levine and Renelt 1992).
Table 2 presents the OLS results of applying an equation such as that above to a sample of 92
developing countries over the period 1980-96.
12
 As the period in question was one of severe
shock and structural change in the world economy, we would expect countries which are
disadvantaged in international trade to be at elevated risk of poor economic performance. The
dependent variable is the average annual compound growth rate of gross national product
(GNP) per capita (r80-96, percent per year), the main independent variable is the investment
rate (IR, gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP). Two alternative measures of
geographical status are employed - a dummy variable (LL) equal to 1 if the country is
landlocked and 0 if not, and the CIF-FOB factor (CIF-FOB). Equations are estimated both
including and excluding initial year GNP per capita (y80, measured in 1995 US dollars).
Table 2 contains six columns, each of which represents estimation results from a different set
of independent variables. The first panel represents results when the entire sample is included
in the estimation. Results for the entire sample confirm the hypothesis that geographic status
is statistically associated with economic growth performance. In all three countries where LL is
                                                                                                                                                                                       
11 On the other hand, as Pritchett (1997) points out, when actual rates of capital formation are taken into account,
the core trend of modern economic history has been absolute divergence between rich and poor countries.
12
 Gross national product (1995 US$), population, and investment rate data are from the 1998 World Bank World
Development Indicators CD-ROM , the cif-fob factor is from the 1995 International Monetary Fund International
Financial Statistics Yearbook . The sample consists of
43 low-income countries, as follows, with LLCs in bold-faced print: Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Dem. Rep., Cote
d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, India, Kenya, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia,
Zimbabwe
49 middle-income-countries: Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep., El
Salvador, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep., Jamaica, Korea, Rep.,
Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia FR (Serbia/Montenegro).
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included as an independent variable, it is significant (only at the 10 percent significance level in
(5)) and negative. Simply averaging across Specifications (2), (5) and (6), we estimate that
landlocked countries grew about 1.5 percentage points slower per year between 1980 and
1996. The CIF-FOB measure is not significantly associated with rate of growth in any of the
specifications where it is included; this may reflect failure to stratify the sample geographically
(as in Table 1) or other statistical problems with the measure. Specification (6), which includes
the initial-income term and excludes the poorly-performing CIF-FOB variable, is our preferred
specification. All coefficients are significant, take the expected sign, and have reasonable
values. A one percentage point increase in the investment rate generates additional economic
growth of 0.16 per cent. Landlockedness reduces average growth per year by about 1.5
percentage points. There is b-convergence. The fit of the equation (adjusted R2 = 0.28) is
acceptable. It is lower than, for instance, the fit obtained by Levine and Renelt (1992), but we
have to consider that our country sample is comprised of the world economy's worst growth
performers.
Conclusion
Where does this leave us? Neoclassical theory gives little reason to believe that landlocked
countries should fare worse than others, but more recent theory would support such a
hypothesis. Landlocked countries are heavily over-represented among the poorest countries in
the world, but this does not necessarily mean that they experience slower growth. However, a
simple regression analysis of growth rates suggests that being landlocked has a rather
dramatic effect: over the period 1960-92, landlocked developing countries grew an average of
1.5 per cent per year slower than countries that were not landlocked.
Several consequences for development policies may be identified. First, as we have argued
above, since problems arising from being landlocked are mediated mostly through transport,
landlocked countries should pay special attention to this sector. Second, as an alternative,
some landlocked countries may wish to adopt development plans emphasizing sectors that are
not dependent on physical transport. Modern advances of telecommunications and information
technology have made this task much easier. Finally, landlocked countries should receive
special protection from the international community against unfair exploitation by their more
lucky coastal neighbors.
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Table 1: Transport Cost Measures for 6 Geographical Clusters (average, 1980–95)
CIF-FOB Factor Ratio of Freight Charges to
Merchandise Imports FOB
West Africa
Landlocked Burkina Faso 128.2 17.5
Mali 142.9 37.8
Niger 116.2 19.4
CAR 110.2 27.4
Chad 134.3 27.8
Average 126.4 26.0
Transit Guinea 110.2 16.5
Cote d'Ivoire 124.1 16.3
Ghana 106.9 7.2
Togo 117.7 12.7
Nigeria 110.7 9.1
Average 113.9 12.4
Southern Africa
Landlocked Botswana 117.6 7.6
Malawi 149.0 55.3
Lesotho 103.7 3.6
Zambia 114.8 17.9
Zimbabwe 111.3 10.9
Average 119.3 19.1
Transit Mozambique 112.0 10.0
Namibia 103.6 7.8
South Africa 109.0 7.8
Tanzania 117.6 14.2
Average 110.6 10.0
Central Africa
Landlocked Uganda 111.0 21.7
Rwanda 143.6 22.9
Burundi 115.0 19.8
Average 123.2 21.5
Transit Kenya 116.1 14.2
Tanzania 117.6 14.2
Sudan 108.3 7.9
Average 114.0 9.1
Note: n.a. refers to not available
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, own calculations.
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Table 1: Continued
Transport Cost Measures for 6 Geographical Clusters
(average, 1980–95)
CIF-FOB Factor Ratio of Freight Charges to
Merchandise Imports FOB
Latin America
Landlocked Bolivia 113.5 15.7
Paraguay 114.8 11.0
Average 114.1 13.4
Transit Argentina 110.1 6.7
Brazil 109.3 10.9
Chile 109.0 1.4
Peru 120.0 7.6
average 112.1 6.7
Asia
Landlocked Nepal 105.0 6.0
Lao PDR 108.8 9.5
Mongolia 102.5 6.4
average 105.4 7.3
Transit India 111.7 10.5
China 109.0 n.a.
Myanmar 110.0 1.9
Thailand 110.9 11.5
Cambodia 109.9 7.5
average 110.6 6.3
Europe
Landlocked Czech Republic 105.0 n.a.
Slovak Republic 105.0 1.1
Hungary 101.6 5.9
average 103.9 2.3
Transit Poland 104.0 6.6
Romania 108.0 5.4
Yugoslavia, FR 109.1 n.a.
Croatia 109.1 n.a.
Slovenia 104.3 1.5
average 107.6 1.7
Note: n.a. refers to not available
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, own calculations.
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Table 2: Growth of Gross Domestic Income Per Capita (OLS Regression Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
r8096 r8096 r8096 r8096 r8096 r8096
IR 0.1517 0.1636 0.1419 0.1512 0.1428 0.1583
(4.33) (4.62) (3.87) (4.20) (4.05) (4.63)
LL -1.7271 -1.0662 -1.5224
(-2.16) (-1.46) (-2.12)
CIF-FOB 0.0189 -0.0019 -0.0100
(0.58) (-0.06) (-0.33)
y80 p. c. -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006
(-2.10) (-2.50) (-2.04) (-2.61)
Constant -2.67 -4.63 -2.77 -1.51 -2.85 -2.41
Std.Error of Reg. 2.16 2.12 2.25 2.19 2.19 2.10
R2 0.26 0.32 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.31
R2 adjusted 0.23 0.27 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.28
Observations 63 62 62 62 63 63
Note: values in parentheses are t-values.
Source: own calculations.
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